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Computer simulations are often expected to provide explanations about target
phenomena. However there is a gap between the simulation outputs and the
underlying model, which prevents users finding the relevant explanatory com-
ponents within the model. I contend that visual representations which ade-
quately display the simulation outputs can nevertheless be used to get
explanations. In order to do so, I elaborate on the way graphs and pictures
can help one to explain the behavior of a flow past a cylinder. I then specify the
reasons that make more generally visual representations particularly suitable
for explanatory tasks in a computer-assisted context.
1. Introduction
Mathematical models are often expected to provide not only predictions
about the phenomenon that they represent, but also explanations (see,
e.g., Bokulich 2009, 2011; Heidelberger 2006; Morrison 2009). These
explanations are answers to why-questions and particularly answers to
why the predicted phenomenon should occur. For instance, models can
be used to calculate when the next total solar eclipse will happen, and then
to explain why it will take place on July 2, 2019. In this regard we can
obtain explanations from a model if we can solve the model equations
which govern the phenomenon under study. But some equations have
no explicit solution or are too complicated to solve. In these cases it is
difficult for a human mind to derive the solutions from the model. This
difficulty reveals a “complexity barrier” beyond which the explanation of
the phenomenon is not accessible without computer assistance (Lenhard
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2006). However, computer simulations are now used by scientists to over-
come this barrier. They notably enable one to solve non-analytical and
complex equations. Besides, the speed of the computational devices allows
one to perform calculations faster than human beings. We might therefore
expect that computer simulations increase our possibilities to get scientific
explanations.
However, answering why-questions with models involves searching for
the relevant explanatory components within the model. And yet, in order
to find these components, it is not enough for the scientist to know the
simulation model, i.e., the model equations, the initial conditions, and the
boundary conditions. The search for relevance is made difficult because
there is a gap between the simulation outputs and the model. This gap
is largely due to the fact that computer simulations are epistemically
opaque (Humphreys 2004); mainly they run too fast for one to follow the
computational processes in detail and, even if it was possible to slow down
the simulation, the simulation would still be too long to be cognitively
grasped by a human mind.
Given the gap between the simulation outputs and the underlying
model, shall we conclude that simulations cannot provide any explanation
at all? This conclusion would be obviously wrong since scientists often use
simulations for a very explanatory aim. A recent response claims that a
possibility for overcoming epistemic opacity can be found in developing
meta-models like those designed by economists (Lehtinen and Kuorikoski
2007; Kuorikoski 2011). But usually, there is no such possibility when we
want to investigate complex systems, e.g., turbulent flows, spin glasses,
population genetic systems, or stock markets. What does remain when
all that we have for describing target phenomena are simulation models?
In this paper, I answer that, even though there is a gap between the simu-
lation outputs and the underlying model, appropriate visual representations—
e.g., graphs, diagrams, pictures, maps, and films—can be used to obtain
explanations; the underlying assumption, though, is that the simulation
model must at least correctly represent the phenomenon in order to explain.
In arguing for that, I first develop on why there is a gap between the
simulation outputs and the underlying model. I then elaborate on the way
graphs and pictures can help one to explain the behavior of a flow past a
cylinder. Lastly, I specify the reasons that make more generally visual repre-
sentations particularly suitable for explanatory tasks in a computer-assisted
context.
2. Gap between Simulation Outputs and Model
In this section, I will develop on why there is a gap between the simu-
lation outputs and the underlying model. First let me put forward a few
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terminological proposals. What I call a model contains theoretical principles
as well as simplifying assumptions. The simulation model—that I also call
the underlying model—contains theoretical principles, simplifying assump-
tions, and mathematical approximations due to the numerical scheme re-
quired for calculations on computers. The program, written in a computer
language, contains the algorithm which describes how to process calculations
from the simulation model. “Computer simulations” designate these calcula-
tions. In this paper, this expression will not be used to refer to the simulated
phenomenon on the computer screen as it is sometimes done in the literature.
The gap between the simulation outputs and the underlying model is a
philosophical concept that can be only considered as valuable if one takes
the perspective of a user who wants to explain a phenomenon with a sim-
ulation. (Otherwise, of course, there is stricto sensu no gap in that the sim-
ulation does connect the simulation outputs with the underlying model).
Thus let me characterize the explanatory task of a user before showing why
there is a gap.
Explaining with a mathematical model is about answering why-questions
about the target system that the model represents. It requires searching for
relevant explanatory components within the model. The search for relevance
in explanations crucially matters and this has been well recognized in several
accounts of explanation (e.g., in Woodward 2003; Salmon 1998; Batterman
2002—even if they have their own definitions of the term).
For the purpose of searching relevance, the user needs at least to know
the content of the model. In the case of simulation models, the user may
gain this knowledge because she conceived and/or wrote and/or carefully
read the program.1 That said, knowing the model is a necessary but not
a sufficient condition for gaining explanations in the case of simulation
models. The reason is that there is a gap between the simulation outputs
and the underlying model. Let me develop on this point.
The gap is a relative concept whose assessment depends on the adopted
account of how to find relevant explanatory components within the under-
lying model. Thus, depending on the adopted account, there are poten-
tially several kinds of gap that hinder the search for relevant explanatory
components within the model. I will present three kinds of gap here.
1. It might seem pointless to emphasize this but actually users sometimes do not have
the occasion to carefully read the computer program because of labor division. In a research
team, people are typically divided into a group of developers and a group of users. Program-
mers mainly focus on the implementation (i.e., the writing of the algorithms) and on the
verification of simulations. While users apply simulations on concrete physical cases: they
prepare the input files that contain the initial conditions and the boundary conditions,
execute the computer program and post-process the simulation outputs. Thus users might
not have access to all the details in the computer program.
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First one may expect to reach relevance as soon as one has an analytic
understanding of the underlying model. One has an analytic understand-
ing of a model if one is able to tell how the simulation outputs result
from the interaction of the different model components (see Frisch
2015). The more simplified and idealized a model is, the easier it is to have
this analytic understanding and thus to identify the relevant explanatory
components among physical principles, initial and boundary conditions.
Because, in simple models, equations simply and explicitly express the
relations of dependence between variables of interest, the user may analyt-
ically penetrate these relations and in this way, may mentally make the
relation between the empirical consequences from the model and the
model itself. However, in simulation models, there are many variables
and the relations of dependence are often non-linear and complicated. It
therefore seems unclear how the different model components interact with
each other and thus how simulation outputs are obtained. In this sense,
there is a gap that one cannot fill based on the sole knowledge of the
underlying model. In the case of climate models, for example, the lack
of analytic understanding has at least three sources. A first source is that
the climate system is a complex system composed of various heterogeneous
components (e.g., general circulation of the atmosphere, cloud formation,
sea and iceberg dynamics, vegetation effect) which interact with each other
in a complicated and sometimes non-linear way. This is also due to the fact
that climate models are characterized by their entrenchment (Lenhard and
Winsberg 2010; Winsberg 2012): the track of the design choices made dur-
ing their creation is not available in that these choices have been made by
different individuals at different times. Thus scientists are not always able
to justify these choices. Lastly, the components interact in the simulations
in a way described in a “kludge,” which is “an inelegant, ‘botched together’
piece of program; something functional but somehow messy and unsatisfy-
ing” (Clark 1987, p. 278; quoted in Lenhard and Winsberg 2010, p. 257).
Second, despite lacking analytic understanding of the underlying model,
one may expect to find relevance by reconstructing the relation between the
simulation outputs and the underlying model. Here the simulation is
thought to be the only thing that stands for the demonstration of the simu-
lation outputs from the model components. Finding relevance requires at
least following the series of logical and mathematical operations that simu-
lations are, before even trying to provide a short demonstration of how
the simulation outputs were obtained. This series is generally not edited in
practice, but let us consider that it can be made available for the sake of
the argument. On this account, the user should go all over the simulation
in extenso and survey every step of the computation, which may help her to
track how the simulation outputs were obtained from the model components.
216 Explaining with Simulations
However, there is a gap here—in another sense than the previous one—
which is due to the fact that computer simulations are epistemically opaque.
On opacity, Humphreys writes:
In many computer simulations, the dynamic relationship between
the initial and final states of the core simulation is epistemically
opaque because most steps in the process are not open to direct
inspection and verification. This opacity can result in a loss of
understanding because in most traditional static models our
understanding is based upon the ability to decompose the process
between model inputs and outputs into modular steps, each of which
is methodologically acceptable both individually and in combination
with the others. (Humphreys 2004, p. 148)
Opacity thus prevents the user comprehending the whole detailed process
by which the simulation produces the connection between the model
assumptions and the simulation outputs; it has at least two sources (see
Humphreys 2004).
The first source is that simulations run so fast that no human brain
could follow or survey the computational processes in detail. For this same
reason, computationally assisted proofs of mathematical theorems, such as
the four-color theorem, are often controversial (McEvoy 2008). Even in the
case where their speed was reduced and adapted to the cognitive skills of
the user so that she could follow the simulation unfolding,2 she would
need a lot of time, due to the large number of calculation steps, to follow
the simulation entirely and she would not be able to cognitively grasp it
anyway. Each computational step is understandable, but it is not possible
to master the simulation in extenso.
The second source of opacity concerns what Stephen Wolfram has called
“computationally irreducible processes” (Wolfram 1985, pp. 737–50). For
Wolfram (1985), the evolution of a physical system may be calculated by
simulating explicitly every physical state through which the system goes,
or by reproducing the outcomes with shortcuts without following all the
states of the system. However, in computationally irreducible processes,
there is no shortcut that may provide an explicit algorithm which would
connect the outcome with the input and therefore would stand for a pos-
sible explanation of the outcome. In such cases, the behavior of the system
can only be found by direct simulation or observation.
2. I borrow this notion from Dubucs (2006) who characterizes derivation in formal sys-
tems “as the process of unfolding the mathematical content of the axioms by means of the
progressive application of the inference rules.” He adds that “running a computer program
can be viewed as unfurling the content implicit in its instructions.”
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That said, we may think that, even if it is not possible for the user to go
all over the simulation in extenso, it may still be possible for her to grasp
some parts of the simulation and thereby to find the relevant explanatory
components. This is the third and last account of how to gain relevance
that I will consider now. Here searching for relevance requires to distin-
guish between relevant and irrelevant details in the computational pro-
cesses. However, there is another kind of gap here due to another form
of opacity that may also prevent the user from identifying the important
elements through the simulation processes. This was later suggested by
Humphreys:
Here a process is epistemically opaque relative to a cognitive agent X
at time t just in case X does not know at t all of the epistemically
relevant elements of the process. A process is essentially epistemically
opaque to X if and only if it is impossible, given the nature of X,
for X to know all of the epistemically relevant elements of the process.
(Humphreys 2009, p. 618)
I would like to make sense of this form of opacity (and to distinguish it
from the first one) by introducing the notion of “explanatory noise.”3 If the
user tries to connect the simulation outputs with the model components
by going through the simulation processes, she would have to consider
details which are relevant for explanations as well as details which may
be important for computational purposes but remain useless for expla-
nations. In other words, she would have to encounter explanatory noise
that I define as being composed of all details that are necessary for the
accuracy of calculations, but are irrelevant in the search for explanation by
a cognitive agent. For instance, algorithms involve conditional loops—e.g.,
if or while—so that at each step the user would have to take into account
all the required conditions and therefore would hardly grasp what is going
on in the simulation. The situation is worse when simulations are used to
study complex systems (that are described with many variables or are gov-
erned by non-analytical equations). Because, here, the user has to take into
account an overwhelming number of data in order to follow the details of
calculations.
The more one encounters explanatory noise, the more difficult it is for a
cognitively unaided human to grasp relations of explanatory relevance be-
tween the inputs and the outputs of simulations. For that matter, this is
the reason why Humphreys (2004) suggests that the epistemic opacity of
simulations (in the first sense) is not necessarily a defect insofar as the
3. The term “explanatory noise” can be found in Batterman (2002) with a different
meaning though.
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negligence of details improves the understanding of the simulated systems.
It seems to be the case that more detailed simulations always have a higher
level of epistemic opacity. Detail and possibility in explanations seem to
be inversely correlated.
The gap between the simulation outputs and the underlying model is a
philosophical concept that nonetheless captures a real difficulty for scientists.
This is well illustrated by the following testimony from oceanographer
Achim Wirth:
As simulation models are mere products of the human creation,
it seems clear that our understanding of nature is almost perfect
because we can calculate or imitate almost perfectly this nature.
Nevertheless the expression “I understand what I have created”
does not represent reality. The creation is done from understood
components as computational models are built from equations
expressing the fundamental laws of physics that we understand.
But the gap between these physical laws and the results of an integrated
realistic global oceanic model is often too big to allow for a genuine
human understanding. The definition of “human understanding”
by a scientist that I adopt is the following one: we have understood
a process if we can explain with words its functioning as well as
its reaction to variations of initial conditions or external parameters.
(Wirth 2010, p. 5; emphasis added)
In a nutshell, the gap between the simulation outputs and the underlying
model may be due to the lack of analytic understanding. It may be due to
two sources of opacity: speed of simulations and absence of short-cuts. Or
it may be due to explanatory noise.
Gap between simulation outputs and the underlying model is an obsta-
cle for one to identify relevant explanatory components within a model.
Therefore, it prevents the user getting explanations with simulations based
on the model components and computational details. However, in the re-
mainder of this paper, I will contend that the search for relevant explan-
atory components may be nevertheless (at least partly) possible via visual
representations (e.g., graphs, pictures, films) that display the simulation
outputs. I will then suggest that this is due to the fact that, when appro-
priately built, visual representations can saliently exhibit, with vivid colors
for example, the relevant pieces of information and ignore the others.
3. Visual Representations of Simulation Outputs
Visual representations are often used in computer-assisted sciences. For ex-
ample, they are ubiquitous in aeronautics, e.g., for describing the trajectory
of spaceships; in molecular chemistry, e.g., for studying the geometrical
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structures and the chemical composition of proteins or DNA, and also in
meteorology and geography.
Their use in computer-assisted sciences is made possible by the devel-
opment of computer graphics and visualization techniques. The creation of
recent journals that deal specifically with these techniques, e.g., Computer
Vision and Image Understanding by Elsevier and Computing and Visualization
in Science by Springer, shows how important visual representations are in
this scientific field.
For computer graphics researcher Thomas Defanti and computer scien-
tist Maxine Brown, “access to visualization is critical” because “it does not
simply represent the best way to look at data; it represents the only way to
see what is going on” (DeFanti and Brown 1991, p. 258). Because com-
puter simulations yield a great amount of data, the spatialization of these
data under, e.g., the form of tables, graphs, or pictures, make the inter-
pretation and the analysis of the data possible. Using an exclusively numer-
ical format, the human brain could not interpret gigabytes of data each
day. Thus, for them,
A technical reality today and a cognitive imperative tomorrow is
the use of images. The ability of scientists to visualize complex
computations and simulations is absolutely essential to ensure the
integrity of analyses, to provoke insights, and to communicate those
insights with others. (Defanti and Brown, 1991, p. 252)
It therefore appears that visual representations play a crucial role in
computer-assisted sciences in that they help us to interpret and to process
the data that computer simulations provide. Some philosophers have also
recognized that visual representations may be actually used to enhance
understanding through simulation models (Humphreys 2004, pp. 110–14;
Lenhard 2006; Carusi 2011, 2012; Boumans 2012).
In what follows, I will argue that, by making the many simulation data
cognitively accessible, visual representations allow one to answer why-
questions about the phenomena being studied. In order to do so, I will
develop a case study. I will elaborate on the way how graphs and pictures
can help one to explain the behavior of a flow past a solid cylinder from
computer simulations. In particular, I will focus on explaining why vor-
tices are induced by the interaction between the cylinder and the fluid
at a certain threshold of the fluid inflow velocity.
The phenomenon of vortices in a flow past an obstacle has received and
still receives great attention from scientists and engineers in view of the
fact that the periodic onset of vortices can sometimes lead to unwanted
structural vibrations which cause fatigue damage of the obstacle. These
vibrations, called vortex-induced vibrations, can have serious consequences
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when, for instance, they occur against bridges, offshore structures, or marine
cables (see Sarpkaya 2004 for a review on theoretical, experimental, and
numerical progress made the past two decades on this issue).
For the sake of simplicity, let us consider the very basic study of the flow
past a cylinder described in terms of a bi-dimensional uniform flow of
velocity vector v in a laminar regime (therefore non-turbulent) without
heat transfer. The fluid is considered to be incompressible and slightly-
viscous (e.g., air and water are slightly-viscous fluids). It circulates around
a solid, smooth, and fixed cylinder of diameter D whose axis is perpen-
dicular to the direction of the flow.
Scientists studied the behavior of a flow past an obstacle prior to the
availability of computer simulations (see, e.g., the work of Adhémar Barré
de Saint-Venant or Ludwig Prandtl in Darrigol 2005). But computer sim-
ulations provide great benefits here. First of all, without computer assis-
tance, this study requires a heavy experimental setup, e.g., a water (or
wind) tunnel coupled with methods of flow visualization such as the par-
ticle image velocimetry technique. Furthermore, simulations generate as
many configurations of the system as desired, like for example configura-
tions of the system at different length scales (e.g., width and length of
the tube, dimension of the cylinder), for various geometrical configurations
(e.g., circular, squared, or diamond-shaped cylinder), for different parameters
(e.g., fluid viscosity, fluid density, Reynolds number). Therefore, it comes as
no surprise that students in physics or in engineering are commonly intro-
duced to this elementary study directly by a numerical approach.
Nevertheless, despite the benefits of simulations here, there is a gap be-
tween the simulation model and the simulation outputs that makes diffi-
cult for the user to get access to relevant explanatory components. In order
to illustrate the gap, let me introduce the model in question under its
computational form, i.e. ready for numerical computation. The model
must contain the equations that govern the behavior of the fluid, and
notably the equation of constraints
→
divðσÞ þ →f ¼ →0.
The stress tensor defined by σðP;→∇vÞ ¼ −P:Id þ μ:TrðDÞ:Id þ 2:η:D.
P is the hydrostatic pressure, μ the dynamic viscosity, η the shear vis-
cosity, and Id the identity matrix. The displacement gradient tensor is
defined as:
D ¼
∂vx
∂x
1
2
⋅
∂vx
∂y
þ ∂vy
∂x
 
1
2
⋅
∂vx
∂y
þ ∂vy
∂x
 
∂vy
∂y
2
664
3
775
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The components of the force exerted on the fluid by the cylinder are:
fx ¼ −ργx ¼ −ρ
∂vx
∂t
¼ −ρð∂vx
∂x
∂x
∂t
þ ∂vx
∂y
∂y
∂t
Þ ¼ −ρðvx ∂vx∂x þ vy
∂vx
∂y
Þ
fy ¼ 0
The boundary condition near the cylinder is the no slip condition
(→v ¼ →0). And the fluid is considered as incompressible (consequently
di→vð→vÞ ¼ →0).
In order to solve the equations, one must work out a numerical scheme
based on the finite element integration of the equations. First the finite
element method consists in discretizing the study domain into finite ele-
ments. Figure 1 displays an example of two-dimensional meshing of the
domain with triangular elements.4We can notice that the finite elements are
smaller near the cylinder wall in order to optimally take into account the
effect of viscosity on the fluid’s behavior (e.g., boundary layer phenomenon).
Since the finite elements are triangular, each element is composed of three
nodes. Each node j is associated with a function βj generated by the con-
catenation of the Lagrange polynomials that are defined for every finite ele-
ment whose one apex is the node j. This function equals one at the node j,
and zero at the other nodes. The total number of nodes in the domain is usu-
ally in the order of several thousand or millions of nodes depending on the
meshing.
Figure 1. Example of meshing
4. Here are the selected geometrical dimensions that I used for the simulations: the
cylinder diameter is 4 mm; the domain width is 3.4 cm; and the domain length is 10 cm.
For the design of the geometry, the meshing, and the simulations I have used the software
COMSOL Multiphysics™.
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Under the weak formulation, the system of equations to solve
become:
ð2η∂vx
∂x
−pÞ ∂β
x
j
∂x
þ ηð∂vx
∂y
þ ∂vy
∂x
Þ∂β
x
j
∂y
þ ρðvx ∂vx∂x þ vy
∂vx
∂y
Þβxj ¼ 0
ηð∂vy
∂x
þ ∂vx
∂y
Þ ∂β
y
j
∂x
þ ð2η∂vy
∂y
−pÞ∂β
y
j
∂y
þ ρðvx ∂vy∂x þ vy
∂vy
∂y
Þβyj ¼ 0
∂vx
∂x
þ ∂vy
∂y
¼ 0
vx, vy, and p are the three variables of the system; they are the two com-
ponents of the fluid velocity and its pressure. The newly obtained equa-
tions are then integrated at each element, i.e. at each βj, and at each
time step when a time-dependent module is needed. For that purpose,
for each node j, the partial differentials of the variables are replaced by
approximations which are calculated with the values of the variables on
the nodes adjacent to the node j.
Let me now develop on why there is a gap between the simulation out-
puts and the model in this particular case. First the weak formulation
hardly gives an analytic understanding in that the terms are complex so
that one cannot easily figure out how the components interact with each
other during the simulations. Second the simulation runs fast on the com-
puter. It only lasts a few minutes, thus making it impossible for a human
being to follow the computational processes. This is what I have identified
as a source of opacity. Furthermore, when the simulation runs, the number
of calculations is proportional to the number of nodes and the time steps,
as well as the number of equations to solve. Thus, even if it was possible to
slow down the simulation it would take too long to survey every calcula-
tion step. Third, there is a gap due to explanatory noise in that many com-
putational steps, e.g., the calculations at each node, are not relevant for
explanations.
Because of the gap, here, it seems to be hardly possible to identify within
the model the relevant explanatory components that may explain the behav-
ior of the flow and especially the onset of vortices. That said, as I will now
show, visual representations help here. The example illustrates how in prac-
tice the user explains simulated phenomena via visual representations.
The starting point of the user’s investigation consists in selecting the
variables she wants to edit from those she deliberately disregards. In other
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words, before running a simulation, the user should already know the
variables of interest. This is an important stage since visual representations
are then used to represent the relations between those variables. In the
example, a user should identify the physical magnitudes which are in-
volved in flow instabilities. She should be interested in the physical impli-
cations of the cylinder on the fluid, and therefore in the evolution of the
force exerted by the surface of the cylinder on the fluid against the varia-
tion of the mean inflow velocity, or more commonly against Reynolds
number.5 The two components of this force are the drag, which is parallel
to the oncoming flow direction, and the lift, which is perpendicular to it.6
Further, she should also be interested in the fluid velocity varying against
Reynolds number. Consequently, she would notably select the drag and lift
coefficients, Reynolds number, and the fluid velocity as the key variables
she wants to edit.
Afterwards, when the simulation ends, the user generally extracts these
outputs from the outputs files by hand or by using a specific subprogram:
this is called post-processing. Then she displays the extracted outputs, or
5. Reynolds number is a dimensionless parameter defined as Re = (ρ.v.DH) / η with ρ
the fluid density (kg/m3), v the mean inflow velocity (m/s), DH the hydraulic diameter (m),
and η the dynamic viscosity of the fluid (kg/(m.s)). The properties of water are the follow-
ing ones: mass density ρ = 103 kg.m−3 and dynamic viscosity η = 10−3 Pl.
6. The drag coefficient CD is defined as CD = |Fx| / ((1/2). ρ. v0
2. DH) and the lift
coefficient CL is defined as CL = |Fy| / ((1/2). ρ. v0
2. DH).
Figure 2. Variation of the drag coefficient against the Reynolds number
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their averages, through visual representations, i.e., graphs, pictures, or
diagrams. For example, from the simulation outputs, she can extract the
drag coefficient values, and then can draw in a graph of the evolution of
the drag coefficient against Reynolds number. From the graph CD(Re), in
figure 2, it results that CD(Re) is a decreasing function. Consequently, she
can draw an initial piece of information: the higher Reynolds number is,
the less the drag has influence on the fluid. Thus the user learns that an
increase in fluid inflow velocity goes with an increase in the cylinder resis-
tance against the fluid, and consequently, provokes a distortion of its own
trajectory, enabling flow instabilities.
For each relevant range of Reynolds number the user can also plot the
fluid velocity fields projected onto the system geometry. Once created, the
three velocity fields in figure 3 give other pieces of information. These fields
are representative of the three following distinctive ranges of Reynolds
number: 0 < Re < 5; 5 < Re < 50; 50 < Re < 300.7 The color scale, from
blue to red, represents the variation of the fluid velocity values, from the
lowest to the highest.
Figure 3. Flow regimes—(a) Re < 5, (b) 5 < Re < 50 and (c) 50 < Re < 300
7. These approximate values of ranges of Reynolds number have been assessed with my
simulations. They must not be considered as reliable values although they are not aberrant.
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From the three pictures in figure 3, we can gain new information about
the three specific laminar flow regimes. Figure 3.a—for Re < 5—displays a
creeping flow for which the velocity field profile is symmetrical and for which
there is no boundary layer separation, i.e., no detachment of the fluid portion
closest to the cylinder wall in flow direction. In figure 3.b—for 5 <Re < 50—
two fixed contra-rotative vortices are formed in the wake of the cylinder. To
see them, we need to plot the streamlines as they are in red in figure 4.
Other simulations, with increasing Re, that are not presented here,
show that as the vortex formation lengthens, the symmetry of the fluid
flow spontaneously breaks down, leading to instabilities. Eventually there
is a separation of the boundary layer, generating a discrete vortex. At this
point a vortex-shedding phenomenon occurs in which vortices are shed
alternatively and periodically at either side of the cylinder. Figure 3.c—for
50 < Re < 300—shows the induced regular pattern of the double row of
vortices in the wake of the cylinder; it is called the von Kármán vortex street.
The frequency of this vortex shedding depends on Reynolds number.
Finally, from figure 3 and figure 4, we can obtain important pieces of
information about the behavior of the flow past a cylinder. In particular
they are helpful in answering why a vortex is emitted when Reynolds
number is superior to 50. The following explanation can be given, which
is inspired from Sumer and Fredsøe (2006). First the boundary layer sep-
arates from the cylinder surface because the divergent geometry of the flow
environment at the rear side of the cylinder imposes an adverse pressure
gradient—as shown in figure 5. Because of this separation, a shear layer
is formed on the right of the separation point (see figure 7). Lastly, the
high vorticity, i.e., circulation per fluid surface, initially contained in
the boundary layer feeds the shear layer as shown in figure 6. Consequently,
the shear layer rolls up into a discrete vortex.
Figure 4. Streamlines (5 < Re < 50)
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Each time, a visual representation provides pieces of information which
are used to answer a specific why-question. Depending on the question,
new appropriate visual representations may be built which aim at pro-
viding relevant pieces of information. Nevertheless we should not think
that visual representations are only useful in a computer-assisted context.
Visualization was already important for Ludwig Prandtl in applying the
Navier-Stokes equations to the flow past a cylinder. It is striking how
similar the scheme of velocity streamlines in the work of Ludwig Prandtl
is to the scheme in figure 4 (Darrigol 2005; Prandtl 1927). Visualization
has been helpful to Prandtl for creating his model, allowing him in this
way to provide approximate solutions to Navier-Stokes equations for in-
viscid incompressible steady flow, and to introduce and explain the bound-
ary layer phenomenon (Heidelberger 2006). It even seems that Prandtl
developed a certain intuition, a “visual understanding” of the phenomena
Figure 5. Pressure gradient
Figure 6. Vorticity magnitude
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before even setting the equations of his model. On that subject, Prandtl
said:
Herr Heisenberg has […] alleged that I had the ability to see without
calculation what solutions the equations have. In reality I do not have
this ability, but I strive to form themost penetrating intuition [Anschauung]
I can of the things that make the basis of the problem, and I try to
understand the processes. The equations come later, when I think I
have understood the matter. (quoted in Darrigol 2005, p. 287)
In the example, explanations of the flow behaviors under different
regimes from simulations are found via investigation of visual representa-
tions. The representations bring pieces of information which derive from
simulations but are not available from the model or the computational pro-
cesses. These pieces of information are explanatory components about the
main characteristic behaviors of the simulated phenomena which are in
turn used in answering why-questions. For example, they allow one to
reconstruct the mechanism of the onset of the first vortex. Yet being able
to get any explanation about the simulated phenomena is another matter.
Visual representations do not completely fill the gap but partly fill the gap
in representing relations between relevant variables which vary all along
the simulation process and whose evolution cannot be tracked through
the computational processes. Visual representations succeed in conveying
relevant explanatory components in such a context because they have some
specific properties that I will now discuss.
4. What makes Visual Representations Important
In this section, I will discuss the properties of visual representations that
make them suitable for explanatory tasks in a computer-assisted context.
Figure 7. Flow regions (diagram built from Figure 1.2 and Figure 1.5 of Sumer
and Fredsøe 2006)
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Visual representations are of course useful here partly due to the fact that
our visual device is well adapted for analyzing pictures and in particular for
recognizing visual patterns. They also have three intrinsic properties that
make them particularly adequate for exploring the relevant explanatory
components within a simulation model. First visual representations can
be made of a great amount of data, thus, being synoptic views of these
data, they can allow the user to get access to several pieces of information
about the simulated phenomena at a single glance. Second, they can reveal
the minimal useful amount of information contained in computer simula-
tions that the user needs to know; they do so by exhibiting the relation-
ships between the appropriate variables. Third, they make this information
easily cognitively graspable in that they represent it in a salient manner.
4.1. Relations of Dependence
Before discussing these three properties, I want to suggest that visual rep-
resentations, built from simulation outputs, are generally presentations of
relations of dependence between variables of interest. This corresponds to
the practice of post-processing simulations which often consists in drawing
on visual representations the variations of relevant variables against other
relevant variables. In this way, visual representations allow the user to
identify relations of dependence. This definition is supposed to work for,
at least, tables, graphs, pictures or films used in a simulation context.
In a table made of numbers, numerical data are arranged in the check-
ered visual support (e.g., paper or computer screen) so that they are in
relation to each other. Each data is placed at a specific position within the
table and this position is also associated with another variable. For example,
let us consider table 1, a table made of the values of drag coefficient CD
against Reynolds number. CD is made in relation with Re because each
datum of CD aligns a datum of Re.
In a graph, a picture, or a map, the data are also arranged in the visual
support. But instead of being under an alphanumeric form, they are rep-
resented by what I shall call an “iconic mark,” e.g., point, dash, dotted line,
asterisk or colored area. These iconic marks are substitutes for some partic-
ular numerical datum and are located in the space of the visual support.
Thus they stand for the datum itself and also for the relation of
Table1. Drag coefficient CD against Reynolds number Re
Re 0,1 0,2 0,5 1 2 5 10 20 50 100
CD 260 130 52 27 15 8 6 5 3 2
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dependence between this datum and the variable(s) that the spatial coor-
dinate of the visual support (paper or computer screen) represents. For
example, the mark “ \” in the graph (figure 2) stands for the relation
between CD and Re. Colored areas (blue, yellow, orange or red) in the flow
pictures (figure 3) stand for the velocity against the actual spatial coordi-
nates of the flow. A simulation film can also be seen as a presentation of
relations of dependence in which the time in the film represents the time
in the phenomenon under study.
My suggestion, i.e., to define visual representations as presentations of
relations of dependence, seems to match the way scientists also conceive
visual representations. In many cases, as Defanti and Brown highlight con-
sidering in particular simulation films, “Scientists want to compute phenom-
ena over time, create a series of images that illustrate the interrelationships
of various parameters at specific time periods” (Defanti and Brown 1991,
p. 253). Now that I have made the suggestion that visual representations are
presentations of relations of dependence, I will now discuss the three properties
that make them valuable means of finding relevant explanatory components.
4.2. Synoptic Views
Making accessible a great amount of data at a first glance is a first general
property of visual representations. It is not specific to their use in simulation
context (Tufte [1990] 2001). In order to illustrate this property, statistician
Tufte (2001) presents a picture of the northern galactic hemisphere (figure 8
Figure 8. The northern galactic hemisphere (Seldner et al. 1977, reproduced in
Tufte 2001, p. 27)
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on the left).8 The picture displays the distribution of 1.3 million galaxies.
Tufte specifies that it “divides the sky into 1,024 × 2,222 rectangles. The
number of galaxies counted in each of the 2,275,328 rectangles is represented
by ten gray tones; the darker the tone, the greater the number of galaxies
counted” (Tufte 2001, p. 26). Tufte writes about the map of the norther
galactic hemisphere that “the most extensive data maps […] place millions
of bits of information on a single page before our eyes. No other method
for the display of statistical information is so powerful” (Tufte 2001, p. 26).
In the pictures of flow (figure 3), as many data are conveyed as there
are nodes in the computational model. More than that: some data which
are interpolated from calculated data are represented there. Indeed colors
have been assigned to the points in the visual support for which there
was no performed calculation; these points are those that are not placed
on the nodes of the grid. The same is true for graphs. In the graph, the
continuous curves go through the calculated data as well as through inter-
polated ones.
The most interesting aspect here is that a visual representation can
exhibit a great amount of data in a structured way. Unlike a messy mass
of data, from which it would be hard to draw relevant pieces of informa-
tion, appropriate visual representations enable one to infer specific pieces of
information about the target system. This is due not only to the fact that
they can convey a great amount of data but also to the fact that they are, as
I have suggested, presentations of relations of dependence. They arrange
within the space of the visual support the many data so that these data
can be in relation with each other. In figure 8, galaxies are arranged within
the space of the northern galactic hemisphere so that the figure gives the
relation between the existence of galaxies and the space.
This is an important property for the purpose of finding explanations
since explaining with a simulation involves recognizing the relevant pieces
of information among the simulation outputs. Let me illustrate this by
considering a user who wants to determine where the lowest fluid veloci-
ties in a flow are. Without visual representations, she would have to exam-
ine the vast amount of simulation outputs, and detect from this the
important pieces of information, i.e. the nodes in which the velocities
are the lowest, and then find out to which positions these nodes correspond
to in the system. This task would of course be tedious if not impossible. By
contrast, visual representations would enable the user to find the positions
8. The north galactic pole is at the center of the picture. The sharp edge on the left
results from the earth blocking the view from the observatory. Around the picture, the view
is obscured by the interstellar dust of the Milky Way.
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immediately in virtue of displaying a great amount of data in a synoptic
manner.
This property is specific to visual representations. Kulvicki (2010) com-
pares the way graphs and images on the one side, and linguistic descrip-
tions on the other, deliver information. From this comparison he concludes
that:
Graphs and images […] are good at providing fine-grained,
quantitative information […]. They can… present vast amounts
of information about a great many features of their objects. The
plausible story is that images and the like deliver a lot of rather
specific information while descriptions and their ken are able to
deliver arbitrarily little. If we only need a little bit of information,
descriptions are the superior means of conveying it, but if we have
a lot of very specific information and we want to deliver it, images
are best. (Kulvicki 2010, p. 297)
Consequently, in computer-assisted sciences, where the amount of computed
data is overwhelming, graphs and images are justifiably very useful tools for
presenting data. In conveying a great number of data, they allow us to draw
pieces of information that one would hardly detect from the numerical data
that simulations generate.
That said, there is a limit, of course, in using visual representations.
As Tufte highlights, “not a great many substantive problems […] are
exclusively two-dimensional. Indeed, the world is generally multi-
variate” (Tufte 1997, p. 17). Thus we can visually present a three-
dimensional object on a picture only by projecting it into a plan. Therefore,
the concrete frame of a visual representation, as well as our visual device,
restrict the number of variables which can be represented in the visual
representation.
4.3. Revealing Power
Visual representations not only have the property to convey a great amount
of data, but they can also reveal important pieces of information that we
can draw from these data. Revealing power is the second property I want
to emphasize. On the one hand, visualization enables one to recognize the
effects of the postulated theoretical structures that are constitutive of the
underlying theory. In the example, visualization enables one to recognize
the effects of the postulated theoretical structures that are constitutive of
hydrodynamic theory such as the boundary layer, the fluid separation, the
shear layer, or the wake. Without visual representations, we would have
the greatest difficulty in distinguishing the flow regions in the mass of
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numerical data generated by simulation. We would not be able to even
assess at which Reynolds number the first vortex is produced since we
would not see any vortex. On the other hand, visual representations reveal
the pieces of information contained in simulations by making them extract-
able. In other words, information stands out on visual representations, en-
abling us to cognitively master it.
That said, for extractability to be met, visual representation must satisfy
a condition outlined by Kulvicki (2010). (We should note that Kulvicki
studies graphs and images in general, not only the ones used in a simu-
lation context). The pieces of information in visual representations are
extractable if each syntactic feature of visual representations—e.g., color,
shade, shape—aims to convey a unique piece of information, no more. For
example, figure 3 presents extractable pieces of information in that, for the
colored regions, “being blue,” “being green,” or “being red” are the features
of the pictures which exclusively indicate specific ranges of fluid velocities.
They carry no other information, for example, about the localization and
the density of the areas of each range of velocities. Other features of the
pictures, such as the relative position and the surface of the colored regions,
are responsible for that.
I want to suggest that extractability is also made possible by the use of
iconic marks. All visual representations (except tables) have iconic marks.
These marks are useful in extraction of information because they carry not
only a datum but also an additional piece of information that is not explic-
itly contained in the data but corresponds to a product of an inference from
these data. For example, the mark “ \ ” in the graph (figure 2) not only rep-
resents data but also symbolizes a decrease of the drag coefficient CD
against Reynolds number Re; while the mark “/” would symbolize an in-
crease. These marks thus deliver directly an immediate piece of informa-
tion that would be less easy—although not impossible—to infer from the
mass of data. Other examples are the colored areas in the flow pictures.
These marks indicate immediately where, for example, the area of lowest
velocity behind the cylinder is (this is the blue area), or where the onset of
a vortex is.
Consequently, it seems that some iconic marks can themselves convey
more than the data since they are perceived features which indicate im-
mediately the results of (longer) inferences that one would have drawn in
browsing the table of data. This immediacy of the extraction of these
results is allowed by our own ability to recognize iconic marks, but also
by their irreducibly conventional (and thereby cultural) nature. For these
markers to be interpreted, the designer of the representation must spec-
ify the rules of interpretation (e.g. legends, scales). But sometimes this is
not needed since some typical iconic marks are well-known and their
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interpretation has become virtually automatic habit. It even seems that this
interpretation needs no effort. As Goodman writes, “practice has rendered
the symbols so transparent that we are not aware of any effort, of any alter-
natives, or of making any interpretation at all” ([1968] 1976, p. 36).
4.4. Selective Function
Visual representations make pieces of information readily available. A third
property of visual representations that I will now discuss is that, under
certain conditions, they can have a selective function in that they can make
only the relevant pieces of information readily available, and ignore the
others. This function, as I will show, helps precisely to overcome the prob-
lem of explanatory noise.
Recall what is at stake. In order to have access to the evolution of rel-
evant variables, one needs to run simulations and to plot these variables of
interest against others. But, if one wants to identify their evolution in the
detail of numerical calculations, one has to consider relevant details as well
as irrelevant details, and therefore encounters explanatory noise. However
visual representations can overcome the problem of explanatory noise if
they are selective. They can saliently exhibit, with vivid colors for example,
the relevant pieces of information which are necessary for the purpose of
reconstructing explanations about the behavior of the system under study,
and ignore the others irrelevant details. They are selective, though, if they
satisfy two conditions which are semantical salience and syntactical salience
(Kulvicki 2010).9
Kulvicki (2010) defines the condition of semantic salience as follows:
syntactic features of visual representations and pieces of information must
be well correlated. In order for a part of a representation to be semantically
salient, it must be straightforward for a user to determine what that part
represents: “there must be a plan of correlation between features of the rep-
resentation and features of the data that is easy to grasp” (Kulvicki 2010,
p. 301). Depending on what kind of explanation one wants to draw from
visual representations, one needs to select the proper relationship between
perceptual features of visual representations and the kinds of information
to display. If, for example, one wants to know the regime of a flow, one would
want to see the global and spatial picture of fluid velocities, like in figure 3,
9. These two concepts are defined by Kulvicki (2010) as conditions for immediacy (the
property of any representation to make some aspects of its content immediately available).
He also adds the extractability of information as a condition for immediacy. But here I want
to suggest that semantical salience and syntactical salience are also conditions for the visual
representations to select relevant pieces of information among other details.
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and must ensure that each range of fluid velocities is well represented by
a distinct color.
The choice of the colors, and more generally the choice of syntactic
features, must also be judicious. Kulvicki calls this condition the search
for syntactic salience. The choice of syntactic features directly affects our
ability to extract information from representations. If, for instance, the
highest range of velocities is in vivid red, the lowest in crimson, and the
intermediate ranges in shades of red, it would be more delicate for us to
distinguish between the distinct colored regions on the visual and to com-
prehend their variation than, for example, the more contrasting colors of the
rainbow. Consequently, we will have more difficulty in figuring out which
regions of the system under study possess a certain range of velocity.
Therefore figure 3 is a good example of visual representations that
meets these two requirements. The pictures only represent, with vivid
colors, the gradient of fluid velocity field against space and for each dif-
ferent range of Reynolds number. The selection of the relevant variables
is prepared by the user, but then visual representations can only make it
possible to present those variables. For that purpose, they do not present
all the approximations of the parameters and of the variables (e.g.,
pressure, forces) needed for the calculation of each velocity in every finite
element. Thus, the explanatory noise constituted by the calculations of
those parameters is “filtered” by the visual representations. Only the
pieces of information, which are deemed relevant in explanations about
the simulated system, are perceptually highlighted by salient syntactic
features.
In sum, if they meet syntactic salience and semantic salience, visual rep-
resentations can make readily available the pieces of information from
computer simulations which are relevant for the reconstruction of expla-
nations about the system under study. Thus, while there is a gap between
the simulation model and simulation outputs, visual representations still
enable one to obtain explanations.
5. Conclusion
I have shown that there is a gap between the simulation outputs and the
underlying model that prevents users from getting explanations. I have
also argued that visual representations can nevertheless be used to access
the relevant explanatory components. I have illustrated this possibility
via the example of the study of a flow past an obstacle. Then I have spec-
ified the reasons that make visual representations particularly suitable for
explanatory tasks in the computer-assisted sciences: they can represent the
great amount of data that computer simulations generate, they reveal the
pieces of information that are hidden in the opaque simulation process,
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and, under certain conditions, they can make readily available only the
pieces of information that matter for the reconstitution of explanations.
Visual representations are therefore precious means of conveying simu-
lation outputs. That said, they probably do not completely fill the gap be-
tween the simulation outputs and the underlying model. There may be
other inconvenience due to opacity and explanatory noise that the use of
visual representations does not avoid.
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